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ABSTRACT
Using a moral hazard model, this study examines the relationship between environmental uncertainty and the adoption of
decentralized IT governance. We show that this relationship is determined by a trade-off between the need for processing 
local information and the concern on moral hazard.  The trade-off results in an inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and decentralization in IT governance. The increase in environmental uncertainty first increases 
and then decreases the likelihood of adopting decentralized IT governance, and thus decentralized IT governance is less
likely to be adopted when the external environment is either highly stable or highly turbulent.  We validate our analytical 
result using a sample of 455 business sites of Fortune 1000 companies.  The empirical analysis provides evidence consistent 
with an inverted-U-shaped relationship between environmental uncertainty and decentralization in IT governance. 
Keywords
IT governance, environmental uncertainty, moral hazard, agency theory
INTRODUCTION
IT governance refers to the organizational pattern of decision-making for IT-related activities, such as the management of IT 
infrastructure, IT principles, application development, service delivery, and IT investment (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; 
2000; Weill and Ross 2005). A major focus of IS research on IT governance concerns with whether the decision authority 
regarding key IT-related activities should be delegated to business units or should they be centrally controlled by a corporate 
IT unit. As it is well recognized that there is no single best IT governance structure since IT needs to fit distinct 
organizational contexts and respond to diverse environments (e.g., Zmud 1984; Agarwal and Sambamurthy 2002), 
understanding how the choice of IT governance is influenced by various organizational and environmental contingency 
factors is important for designing effective IT organizational structure. 
Prior research has studied a variety of organizational factors and environmental factors that influences IT governance. 
Organizational factors include: firm size (Ahituv et al. 1989; Brown and Magill 1994; Clark 1992; Ein-Dor and Segev 1982; 
Tavakolia 1989), corporate strategy (Brown and Magill 1994; Tavakolia 1989), and corporate governance structure (Ahituv 
et al. 1989; Brown and Magill 1994; Tavakolia 1989; Olson and Chervany 1980). External environmental factors include 
industry type and environmental turbulence (Brown and Magill 1994; Brown 1997; Hann and Weber 1996). The main 
argument here is that IT governance is a trade-off between cost-efficiency and the need for processing local information.  
When the potential benefits of cost-efficiency are large, firms are more like to adopt centralized IT governance. For example, 
it is well-accepted that centralized governance may be less cost-efficient in large, multidivisional corporations.  As a result, 
large firms are more likely to adopt decentralized IT governance (Ein-Dor and Segev 1982).  Also, the need for processing 
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local information influences IT governance. As specialized knowledge about how to response to the environment often 
resides with business units, organizations may decentralize IT governance to enable business units to better process external 
information.  For example, it has been shown that decentralized IT governance is more likely to be adopted in organizations 
with decentralized corporate governance, as division units are more informed about their specific business processes (Brown 
and Magill 1994; Ein-Dor and Segev 1982; Tavakolian 1989).  Likewise, firms with unrelated businesses are more likely to 
adopt decentralized IT governance (Boynton et al. 1994) due to the information asymmetry between the headquarters and 
business units.  
Past research has hypothesized a positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and decentralization in IT 
governance (e.g., Allen and Boynton 1991). The rationale is that in uncertain environments, organizations tend to have 
increased needs for information processing (Galbraith 1973) and decentralized IT governance enables responsiveness by 
improving business units’ information processing capabilities (Allen and Boynton 1991). However, the results of empirical 
studies are mixed. For example, in a case study, Brown (1997) finds that unstable industry environment drives the 
organization to adopt decentralized governance in system development.  On the other hand, Hann and Weber (1996) do not 
find significant empirical evidence that higher level of environmental uncertainty is associated with higher levels of 
delegation of IS decision rights to IS managers. Our research data on IT purchase decision at 455 business sites of Fortune 
1000 companies shows a similar pattern. An analysis of the correlation between decentralization in IT purchasing decisions
and environmental uncertainty reveals that firms tend to adopt centralized, rather than decentralized IT governance in more 
turbulent and complex business environments (the correlation table is in Section 3 of this paper). 
The reason for these mixed empirical results, we argue, is that prior studies examining the relationship between 
environmental uncertainty and decentralization in IT governance overlook the potential moral hazard problem.  While 
environmental uncertainty increases the value of decentralization from the perspective of information processing, it also 
exaggerates the moral hazard problem as it is harder for headquarters to monitor business units’ decisions in more uncertain 
environments. Thus the objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
decentralization in IT governance, in the presence of moral hazard problem. 
Drawing upon the agency theory, we build an analytical principal-agent model to illustrate two conflicting forces that 
environmental uncertainty exhibits. First, the model captures how environmental uncertainty drives the firm (the principal) to 
delegate IT decision rights to business units (the agent) in order to leverage business units’ information advantage. Second, 
the model captures how environmental uncertainty may amplify the agency cost associated with delegation of authority. The 
agency cost manifests itself as the business units’ discretionary investment that is not monitored by the headquarters (moral 
hazard). Considering these two forces, the model reveals that the relationship between environmental uncertainty and 
decentralization in IT governance is an inverted-U relationship. In either highly stable or highly uncertain environments, 
organizations tend to adopt more centralized IT governance. Decentralized IT governance is the optimal choice only when 
the level of environmental uncertainty is in an intermediate range. Our study also reveals that the net benefit of 
decentralization, i.e., the benefit of processing local information net of agency cost, first increases and then decreases with 
environmental uncertainty. That is, the relationship between the likelihood of adopting decentralized IT governance and 
environmental uncertainty exhibits an inverted-U-shaped relationship. 
To confirm the implication of the analytical model, we conduct an empirical study to test the existence of an inverted-U-
shaped relationship between environmental uncertainty and IT governance. We analyze a dataset capturing the IT purchasing
decisions at 455 divisional sites of Fortune 1000 companies from year 2001 to 2005. The empirical analysis considers the 
probability that these sites adopt decentralized decision-making in IT purchasing.  We find that sites in highly stable or highly 
uncertain business environments are more likely to adopt centralized decision-making in IT purchasing. Decentralized 
decision-making in IT purchasing is more likely to be adopted for sites in the business environments with intermediate 
uncertainty.
This research contributes to the IT governance research by illustrating a nonlinear relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and IT governance that has not been captured in the existing literature. Existing literature on IT governance
largely recognizes the information advantage of local decision makers in unstable environments, and therefore focuses on the 
positive relationship between environmental uncertainty and decentralization. This research adopts the moral hazard 
perspective and provides new insights as an explanation for the discrepancy between prior theoretical prediction and 
empirical findings on the influence of environmental uncertainty on IT governance.  The examination of this nonlinear 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and IT governance also follows the call of Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) to 
study multiple effects of contingency factors on IT governance. Sambamurthy and Zmud (1999) note that existing literature 
on IT governance has focused on the singular effects of the contingency factors, and therefore they apply the theory of 
multiple contingencies to examine the interaction effects (e.g., amplifying, dampening, or overriding) between multiple 
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contingency factors. This paper takes another perspective and extends the research on IT governance by examining multiple 
conflicting forces (i.e., information processing versus agency cost) of the environmental uncertainty contingency factor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an analytical principal-agent model to illustrate the 
relationship between environmental uncertainty and decentralized IT governance. Section 3 describes the empirical study that 
tests the relationship between environmental uncertainty and decentralized IT governance. Section 4 concludes the paper and 
discusses directions for future research. 
THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
We posit that the organization is comprised of a headquarter and a business unit. The headquarter is considered as the 
principal and the business unit is considered as the agent. The state of the world faced by the business unit is represented by 
an unknown random variable .  is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ and variance v. Note that the value of v
captures the degree of environmental uncertainty. Both the principal and the agent can learn the state of the world. 
Specifically, the principal can observe a noisy signal S, which is normally distributed with mean  and variance of d. The 
agent, in contrast, observes the value of . Therefore, the term d captures the degree of information asymmetry between
different levels of management, or the degree of information advantage of the agent. The purpose of acquiring information 
about the state of the world is to assist IT investment decision at the business unit level. Suppose the IT investment is I, the 
payoff of the principal is represented as 
PU I I=  (3.1)
where the term I  is defined as the return of the IT investment. Note that (3.1) implies that the payoff of the principal is a 
concave function of the investment. This functional form has been used to model investment return in many other studies 
(e.g., Agrawal 1996). The principal’s objective is to maximize the profitability of IT investment. The payoff of the agent is 
represented as 
( )1AU I I aI I a I =  + =    (3.2)
Note that compared with (3.1), the agent derives extra utility (captured by aI ) in making excess investment. Such private 
interest in excess investment can be explained from various perspectives, such as empire-building (Harris and Raviv 1998).
We first examine the case when the principal pursues centralized IT governance. In this case, the principal, rather than the 
agent, chooses the IT investment. The principal will choose an IT investment ( )maxC I PI E U  (the superscript C denotes 
the case of centralization). Given the normal prior distribution of  and the normal signal, the posterior distribution of  is 
normal with mean ( ) ( )/vs d v dµ+ +  and variance ( )/vd v d+  (Cyert and DeGroot 1987). Therefore, given the signal 
observed by the principal, its expected payoff can be represented as ( ) ( )PE U E I IS=  . The first-order condition 
(FOC) ( ) / 0pE U I	 	 =  yields the optimal IT investment in the case of centralization, 
( )[ ] ( )
2 2| 1
4 4
C E s vs dI
v d
 µ+
= =
+
The principal’s expected payoff in the case of centralization can be represented as 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 21 1
2 4 4 4
C
P
vs d vs d vE U E
v d v d v d
µ µ µ

+ +
=  = +
+ + +
 
     
 (3.3)
Second, we examine the case when the principal pursues decentralized IT governance. In this case, the agent decides the level 
of IT investment. Since the agent maximizes its own payoff, the IT investment satisfies ( )maxD I AI E U  (the superscript D
denotes the case of decentralization). Also, since the agent always observes , its payoff conditional on observing  can be 
represented as ( )1AU I a I=   . The FOC / 0A IU	 	 =  yields the optimal IT investment 
( )
2
2 1
DI
a
=

 
  
Therefore, the principal’s expected payoff in the case of decentralization can be represented as 
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 (3.4)
Comparing (3.3) with (3.4), the principal will choose centralized IT governance when C DP PE U E U       , and choose 
decentralized IT governance if C DP PE U E U<       . To help understand the trade-off between the need for information 
processing and the moral hazard problem, we can rewrite the principal’s expected payoff in the centralization case as 
( )
2
4 4
C
P
v v dE U
v d
µ +
= 
+
    (3.5)
and the principal’s expected payoff in the decentralization case as
( )
2 22
4 1 4
D
P
v vaE U
a
µ µ+ +
= 

       
(3.6)
Note that the first term in (3.5) and (3.6), 
2
4
vµ +
, represents the principal’s expected payoff if it always observes the state of 
the world  and adopts centralized IT governance. The second term in (3.5), ( )4v dv d+ , represents the cost of information 
disadvantage, i.e., the cost induced by the principal’s inability to always observe the state of the world. The second term in 
(3.6), ( ) ( )221 4 vaa µ + , represents the agency cost, i.e., the cost induced by the agent’s incentive to overinvest. The choice 
between centralization and decentralization can then be determined by the comparison between the cost of information 
disadvantage associated with centralization and the agency cost associated with decentralization. Proposition I summarizes 
the optimal solution for the principal (due to the page limit, the mathematic details of proof are not included in the paper but 
are available from the authors upon request).
Proposition I. 1) When the agent has too much private incentive to overinvest ( 12a  ), the principal chooses centralized IT 
governance;
2) When the agent has limited private incentive to overinvest ( 12a < ), principal’s choice of IT governance depends on its 
information disadvantage and environmental uncertainty.  When his information disadvantage is small ( ( )
2 2
1 4 1
a
a a
d µ  ) , the 
principal chooses centralized IT governance.  When his information disadvantage is significant ( ( )
2 2
1 4 1
a
a a
d µ > ), the 
principal’s choice of IT governance depends on environmental uncertainty v:  
2.1) when environmental uncertainty is small ( 1v v ) , the principal chooses centralized IT governance;
2.2) when environmental uncertainty is of an intermediate value, ( 1 2v v v< < ), the principal chooses decentralized IT 
governance;
2.3) when environmental uncertainty  is large ( 2v v ),, the principal chooses centralized IT governance.
Proposition 1 indicates that it is always optimal for the principal to centralize the IT governance when the agent has too much 
private incentive to overinvest or when it has little information disadvantage compared to the agent. In these two cases, the 
level of environmental uncertainty does not affect the principal’s decision. Therefore, we focus on the more interesting and 
relevant case illustrated by Proposition I.2.1-I.2.3 where the level of environmental uncertainty affects the principal’s 
decision. 
As Proposition I.2.1 states, when the degree of environmental uncertainty (v) is small enough, the principal chooses 
centralized IT governance. This is consistent with the suggestion in prior literature that centralized IT governance is more 
likely to be adopted in stable environments (Allen and Boynton 1991). In this case, the cost of information disadvantage is 
smaller than the agency cost. The gain of decentralization, represented by D CP PE U E U       , is negative and 
decentralization is dominated by centralization. However, as stated in Proposition I.2.3, in a highly uncertain environment 
where v is sufficiently large, it is also optimal for the principal to choose centralized IT governance. In this case, the agency 
cost is large enough to exceed the cost of information disadvantage. Proposition I.2.2 reveals that the principal chooses 
decentralized IT governance only when the environmental uncertainty is of an intermediate value, i.e. 1 2v v v< < . The key 
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implication here is that when v is large, the agency cost associated with decentralized IT governance can also be high and 
eventually offset the benefit of local information brought about by decentralization. Proposition II further characterizes the 
benefit of decentralization. 
Proposition II. The gain of decentralization, defined by D CP PE U E U       , first increases and then decreases in 
environmental uncertainty v. 
Proposition II indicates that there is an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the benefit of decentralization and 
environmental uncertainty. Using a numerical example with 0.3a = , 1µ = , and 2d = , Figure 1 presents how the gain of 
decentralization changes with environmental uncertainty v. As Figure 1 illustrates, when v<0.26, the gain of decentralization 
is negative since the cost of information disadvantage is lower than agency cost. In this case, it is optimal for the principal to 
choose centralization. When v<2.67, the gain of decentralization is increasing in v. However, when v exceeds 2.67, the gain 
of decentralization starts to decrease in v. When v>7.6, the gain of decentralization is also negative. In this case, it is also 
optimal for the principal to adopt centralization. Only when 0.26<v<7.6, the gain of decentralization is positive (since the cost 
of information disadvantage is higher than agency cost) and thus the principal finds it optimal to delegate decision-making to 
the agent. 
Figure 1. The Gain of Decentralization as a function of Uncertainty v
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To test the analytical result of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between environmental uncertainty and IT goverance, we 
conduct an empirical study using a unique dataset on IT purchase decision at the business unit level. The data on IT 
governance is obtained from the CI Technology Database. This database contains information about the IT infrastructure in 
over 500,000 sites in the United States and Canada. The information in the database covers 10 key IT areas, including 
personal computing, systems and servers, networking, software, storage, and managed services. This database has been used 
in existing IS literature (e.g., Hitt 1999). CI database also records three types of IT decision at each business site: PC 
purchasing decision, server purchasing decision, and network purchasing decision. For each decision, the database indicates 
whether this decision is made by the headquarters (represented as “Parent”) or by the business units (represented as “Local”). 
In other words, the CI database captures the degree of centralization/decentralization in IT purchasing decision at the site-
level. From this database, we build our data sample containing 455 business unit sites, all of which belong to Fortunate 1000 
companies.. Since our measures of environmental uncertainty are based on data over a 5-year period from 2001 to 2005 (see 
below for details), we select those business unit sites with no significant change in their IT governance pattern within this 5-
year period. 
We also complement our dataset with two other data sources. First, we use Compustat Segment database to measure 
environmental uncertainty for each business site. Following strategy literature, we measure environmental uncertainty using 
three variables: dynamism, munificence, and complexity (details are provided below). Second, we measure the business 
relatedness between each site and its headquarter using industry date from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Following prior 
Gain of Decentralization
E[UPD]- E[UPC]
Uncertainty v
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literature (e.g., Fan and Lang 2000), we measure the business relatedness using three variables: vertical relatedness (StVI), 
horizontal relatedness (StHC), and product market diversification (StDiv). Vertical relatedness captures the degree of vertical 
integration between the division and the headquarter in terms of buying and selling activities. Horizontal relatedness captures 
commonality between the division site’s and the headquarter site’s buying and selling processes. Product market 
diversification is measured by the difference between the division’s and the headquarter’s participation in different NAICS 
industries. These variables are used as control variables in our empirical model. 
Operationalization
We use a binary variable ITDec to indicate whether a business site adopts more centralized decision-making or more 
decentralized decision-making in IT purchasing. Since there are three types of IT purchase decision (i.e., PC, server, 
network) recorded for each site, if at least two decisions are made by local managers, we set ITDec=1, which means that the 
business site adopts a more decentralized decision-making in IT purchasing. Otherwise, if at least two decisions are made by 
the headquarter site, we set ITDec=0, which means that the business site adopts a more centralized decision-making in IT 
purchasing.  
Following Keats and Hitt (1988), we measure 3 environmental variables: dynamism (Dyn), munificence (Mun), and 
complexity (Cmpx) (Keats and Hitt, 1988). Dynamism captures the uncertainty in demand, munificence captures the sales 
growth in an industry, and complexity captures the uncertainty caused by competition. Dynamism and munificence are 
measured using a two-step procedure. First, the natural logarithm of the total sales of four-digit NAICS industries is regressed 
against an index variable of years over a period of five years. Then the antilog of the standard error of the regression 
coefficient is used as the measure for dynamism, and the antilog of the regression coefficient is used as the measure for 
munificence. To measure complexity, we first run a regression of market shares of all firms in an industry against their 
market shares five years ago. Then the regression coefficient of the independent variable is taken as the measure of 
complexity.  
We also have the following control variables. First, we use the ratio of IT employees to total employees as a control variable 
for the IT knowledge at the site-level. Second, we use the logarithm of the site’s total employee as a control variable for the 
site’s size. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables and correlation among them. As Table 1 illustrates, 
the degree of decentralization has a negative correlation with all of the three environmental factors. This suggests that more 
decentralized IT governance is not adopted in highly uncertain environments. 
Mean SD ITDec StVI StHC StDiv Dyn Mun Cmpx ITEmp StEmp
ITDec 1.66 0.47 1 -.092 -.053 .070 -.127** -.094* -.107* -.063 .190**
StVI 0.08 0.11
-.092 1 .390** -.317** .406** -.261** .031 .160** -.014
StHC 0.67 0.34 -.053 .390** 1 -.756** .186** .042 .096* .010 .047
StDiv 0.99 0.80 .070 -.317** -.756** 1 -.204** -.074 -.169** .077 -.158**
Dyn 1.19 0.14
-.127** .406** .186** -.204** 1 -.405** .129** .088 -.041
Mun 0.96 0.20
-.094* -.261** .042 -.074 -.405** 1 .420** -.117* .028
Cmpx 0.96 0.66
-.107* .031 .096* -.169** .129** .420** 1 .084 -.004
ITEmp 0.18 0.12
-.063 .160** .010 .077 .088 -.117* .084 1 -.344**
StEmp 2.44 0.59 .190** -.014 .047 -.158** -.041 .028 -.004 -.344** 1
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table
** p < 0.01 (2-tailed); * p < 0.05 (2-tailed); N=455
The Inverted-U-Shaped Relationship
We examine how environmental uncertainty influences decentralization in IT purchasing decisions. We use a series of binary 
logistic regression models to test the relationship between the environmental uncertainty and the adoption of decentralized IT 
governance at each business site. The logistic regression models are represented as follows, 
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Logit(P) = 0 + 1Dyni + 2Muni + 3Cmpxi + 4ITEmpi + 5StVIi + 6StHCi (4.2)
+ 7StDivi + 8StEmpi + 9Unci2 + i
where P= Prob(ITDeci=1) and Unc={Dyn, Mun, Cmpx}. Note that the dependent variable ITDec is coded as a binary 
variable with value 0 (centralization) or 1 (decentralization). The logistic regression model basically captures how different 
organizational variables (such as StVI and ITEmp) and environmental variables (i.e., Dyn, Mun, Cmpx) influence the 
probability of adopting a more decentralized IT purchasing decision at each business site. By including a square term Unc2 in 
the estimation model (4.2), we examine a nonlinear relationship between each environmental variable and the 
decentralization in IT purchasing decision. The results are presented in Table 2. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value
(Constant)
-11.435 6.421 -2.182 .433 2.143 .219
Dyn 22.637* .033 -.416 .740 -1.758† .071
Mun
-2.773** .001 5.626† .077 -1.412† .067
Cmpx .039 .844 .035 .854 .114 .639
ITEmp
-.107 .906 -.148 .870 .271 .764
StVI
-1.919† .087 -2.371* .038 -1.742 .107
StHC .379 .444 .463 .344 .446 .364
StDiv .195 .352 .188 .367 .226 .280
StEmp .687** .001 .615** .003 .724** .000
Dyn2
-9.831* .019
Mun2
-3.993** .016
Cmpx2
-.198* .041
Pseudo-R2 0.129 0.127 0.131
Table 2. Logistic Model Results
Note: 1. Dependent Variable: Logit(P); 2. N = 455; 3. ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1.
As Table 2 indicates, for model 1, the coefficient of Dyn is positive and significant, and the coefficient of Dyn2 is negative 
and significant. This suggests that the increase of dynamism first increases and then decreases the probability of adopting 
decentralized IT purchase decision, i.e., an inverted-U-shaped relationship. Also, for model 2, the coefficient of Mun is 
positive and significant, and the coefficient of Mun2 is negative and significant. This suggests that the increase of 
munificence first increases and then decreases the probability of adopting decentralized IT purchase decision. For model 3, 
the coefficient of Cmpx2 is negative and significant; the coefficient of Cmpx, although insignificant, is still positive. 
Therefore, the results generally support the implication of our analytical model that the relationship between environmental 
uncertainty and the likelihood of adopting decentralized IT governance is an inverted-U-shaped relationship. 
Figure 2 indicates an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the probability of decentralized IT purchasing decision and 
dynamism (with other independent variables at their mean values). When the absolute value of dynamism is small (i.e., 
Dyn<1.16), the probability of adopting decentralized IT purchase decision at a certain business site increases if dynamism 
increases. However, when the absolute value of dynamism is large (i.e., Dyn>1.16), the probability of adopting decentralized 
IT purchasing decision decreases in dynamism. Figure 3 shows a similar relationship between the probability of decentralized 
IT purchasing decision and munificence. The shapes of curves in Figure 2 and 3 are identical in nature to that in Figure 1. 
Therefore, the empirical study provides a general support for the implications of the theoretical model. 
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Figure 2. The Inverted-U-Shaped Relationship between Dynamism 
and the probability of high decentralization (ITDec=1)
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Based on principal-agent theory, this study builds an analytical model to explain how environmental uncertainty influences 
the organization’s IT governance. The key insight of this model is that environmental uncertainty impacts IT governance 
through two countervailing forces. On one hand, organizations in highly uncertain environments tend to adopt decentralized 
IT governance to leverage local managers’ information advantage. On the other hand, highly unstable environments can
induce managers to behave more strategically (the moral hazard problem) and exaggerate the agency cost. Therefore, the 
model suggests that decentralized IT governance may not be desirable in both the highly static environments and the highly
uncertain environments. In highly static environments, the benefit of decentralization (i.e., the local managers’ information 
advantage) is not significant enough, and firms do not have strong need for responsiveness. Highly unstable environments, on 
the other hand, may induce more strategic behaviors by the agents. In this case, the agency cost can be very high and offset 
the benefit of decentralization. Moreover, the analysis suggests that as environmental uncertainty increases, the benefit of 
decentralization first increases and then decreases, exhibiting an inverted-U shape. Using a dataset of business sites, the 
empirical study in this paper confirms the key findings of the theoretical analysis. 
Figure 3. The Inverted-U-Shaped Relationship between Munificence
and the probability of high decentralization (ITDec=1)
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This study calls for further consideration of the impact of the moral hazard problem and agency cost on IT governance. Hann 
and Weber (1996) find in their study that more delegation in decision-making is not associated with higher ex post agency 
cost. In their study, ex post agency cost refers to the cost of ensuring that the agent acts in accordance with the overall goals 
of the organization. In our study, agency cost is considered as economic loss (or inefficiency) caused by the strategic 
behaviors of the agent. Although the notion of agency cost in Hann and Weber (1996) is different from that in our study, their 
finding still provides an indirect support for our argument. Kahai, et. al. (2001) also find in their study on Fortune 1000 
companies that the decision authority of IT management is more centralized than the allocation of IT recourses. Their 
explanation is that organizations seek to centralize their decision-making on hardware and software to save costs and avoid 
unrestricted proliferation. Excess expenditure and unrestricted proliferation can also be considered as examples of the agency 
cost.      
One limitation of this study is that the IT purchasing decision in this study is mainly about hardware infrastructure. The 
decision making about other aspects of IT, such as software management and project management, may have different 
features. For example, the adoption of ERP systems may require centralized governance of software management, even 
though the hardware purchasing decision can be decentralized. Future studies may focus on different aspects of IT 
governance and explore whether environmental factors have similar influences on those aspects. The second limitation is that 
we did not directly measure the extent of agency cost. One direction for future research is to directly measure the extent of 
agency cost and explicitly study whether agency cost tends to be higher in uncertain environments.   
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